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Abstract
Many online systems for bilateral transactions elicit performance feedback from both trans-
acting partners. Such bilateral feedback giving introduces strategic considerations. We focus on
reciprocity in the giving of feedback: how prevalent a strategy of giving feedback is only if feed-
back is first received from one’s trading partner. The overall level of feedback activity clearly
depends on the prevalence of the reciprocation strategy: in a market with many reciprocators and
few unconditional feedback providers, the equilibrium quantity of feedback can be quite low. We
estimate the prevalence of such reciprocation in one market, eBay. Reciprocation cannot be di-
rectly distinguished from late feedback that was not conditioned on the partner having provided
feedback. We develop a model that distinguishes the two by exploiting information about the tim-
ing of feedback provision when the partner does not provide feedback. We find that buyers and
sellers on eBay used the “reciprocate only” strategy about 20-23% of the time. We also measure
the extent to which the prevalence of these strategies changes with the experience levels of the two
parties and with the item price.
KEYWORDS: feedback provision, reputation systems, e-commerce
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1 Introduction
Reputation systems enable trade among strangers by informing people about their
trading partner’s past performance, which also creates incentives for good behavior
(Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and Kuwabara, 2000, Dellarocas, 2003). Many
online marketplaces offer reputation systems based on subjectively provided feed-
back. For example, buyers rate sellers on Amazon’s marketplace, and those ratings
are visible to future buyers.
In some cases, feedback provision is two-sided. For example, at couch-
surfing.net, where travelers find free places to stay while traveling, both hosts and
travelers can rate each other. eBay buyers and sellers can rate each other. Many
other two-sided markets are also candidates for two-sided reputation systems, such
as dating sites, housing matches, and ride-sharing services.
Subjectively reported two-sided feedback introduces strategic considera-
tions: whether to provide feedback, and the content of that feedback, may be influ-
enced by the partner’s actual or expected feedback-giving behavior. For example,
anecdotes suggest that some eBay users employ a feedback-giving strategy we call
“reciprocation”: they only give feedback after receiving feedback from their trad-
ing partners.1 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that buyers and sellers withhold
negative feedback in order to avoid receiving retaliatory negative feedback. eBay
conducted experiments on alternative feedback designs and, in 2008, removed the
option for sellers to provide negative feedback to buyers, though they can still pro-
vide positive feedback and buyers can still provide either kind (Bolton, Greiner, and
Ockenfels, 2009).
While two-sided subjective feedback may inhibit provision of negative feed-
back, it may help solve an under-provision problem for positive feedback. Feedback
information is a public good: one person’s consumption of published feedback does
not diminish another’s use of it. Theory predicts that in general public goods will
be under-provided (Samuelson, 1954). The free-rider problem seems especially
pernicious because feedback only benefits other users, not its provider, so that self-
interested users then appear to have little or no incentive to provide feedback. Nev-
ertheless, more than half of the traders on eBay provide feedback (Resnick and
Zeckhauser, 2002). Why?
1For example, on Yahoo!Answers a user posted the question “Why do eBay sell-
ers not give feedback as soon as you pay?” and received the following best answer:
“Many sellers wait until they receive feedback from the buyer before they leave feedback”
(http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20060816131534AAecgGz, retrieved on Sept 14,
2010). Similar conversations also occurred on eBay’s forum (e.g., http://reviews.ebay.com/Who-
Should-Leave-Feedback-First-The-Buyer-or-Seller W0QQugidZ10000000000766286, retrieved on
Sept 14, 2010).
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There are many possible motivations, likely experienced to a greater or
lesser degree by different people. For example, some may freely contribute feed-
back because they are altruists, willing to incur a small cost to contribute to the
community (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Some may exhibit “reciprocal altruism”
(Andreoni and Miller, 1993, Gächter and Falk, 2002), a tendency to give people
“what they deserve”, in this case a positive feedback in return for a good transac-
tion and a negative feedback in return for a bad one. Some may provide feedback
to avoid the hassle of partners asking for or demanding it. Some may fear that if
word gets around that they don’t provide feedback, partners will take advantage of
them (Gazzale, 2004, Chapter 1).
Another reason to provide feedback is that it may spark the desirable event
of the partner providing feedback. If many of one’s transaction partners employ a
feedback reciprocation strategy, then providing feedback first can be a way to build
one’s own feedback profile faster. If everyone followed a strategy of reciprocat-
ing feedback, and no one chose to give unconditionally, no one would ever be the
first to provide feedback and none would be provided. On the other hand, if no
one followed a reciprocation strategy, one of the incentives for providing feedback
would be removed. Estimating the prevalence of feedback reciprocation provides a
window into the complex ecology of feedback provision.
Of course, that begs the question of why a self-interested party would em-
ploy a strategy of giving feedback after receiving it. Clearly, having one’s partner
expect such feedback reciprocation can induce the partner to provide positive feed-
back (in order to get it in return) and to remain silent rather than providing negative
feedback after a bad transaction (in order to avoid getting it in return). In a one-shot
game, however, in the absence of a binding feedback reciprocation contract, actu-
ally delivering the reciprocal feedback, at some cost of effort, would not be rational.
With repeated interactions, some form of direct retaliation may be sufficient for a re-
ciprocation equilibrium. Or, even without repeated direct interaction, a generalized
reciprocity equilibrium may emerge (Jian and MacKie-Mason, 2008). As with any
feedback provision, some reciprocators may also want to follow through on provid-
ing feedback for the non-rational reason of giving a gift to, or taking vengeance on
their partners, in this case rewarding or punishing the partners’ feedback rather than
the partners’ action in the underlying sales transaction.
We do not propose a specific theoretical model for why feedback recipro-
cation occurs: we would not be able to estimate a structural model with the data
available to us in any case. Rather, using a large dataset of eBay transactions we
test for the prevalence of reciprocation, and the prevalence of two alternative strate-
gies, unconditional provision and non-provision. We find that buyers and sellers on
eBay used the “reciprocate” strategy about 20-30% of the time. We also measure
the extent to which the prevalence of these strategies changes with the experience
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levels of the two parties, and with the item price. For example, in bilateral trans-
actions, the relative experience levels may matter as inexperienced traders learn the
strategy equilibrium, while more experienced traders may be trying to teach their
partners.2 Dellarocas and Wood (2008) have found that the level of traders’ sat-
isfaction varies with item price; we explore whether it affects the prevalence of
reciprocal or non-reciprocal feedback giving strategies.
We also make methodological contributions to the estimation of feedback
provision strategies in two-sided reputation systems. When both parties provided
feedback, it is not clear whether they did so independently or whether the second
did so in response to the first. When neither party provided feedback, it is not
clear whether their decisions were unconditional or whether one or both would have
provided feedback had the other done so. This is a problem in estimating choice
when the underlying decision variables are latent (unobservable). We develop a
latent variable estimation procedure that takes advantage of the observable timing
of feedback provision to identify and estimate reciprocal feedback-giving strategies.
We are not the first to develop econometric models to identify reciprocal feedback-
giving strategies. Previously, Dellarocas and Wood (2008) developed a different
model to study both the biases in feedback ratings and reciprocal feedback-giving
behavior. Our models differ in various ways, as detailed in section 2.
2 Related Work
Previous work on feedback provision has estimated the impact of prior negative
feedback in a seller’s history on the buyers’ willingness to provide negative feed-
back. Resnick and Zeckhauser hypothesized that buyers may “stone” sellers who
have received negative feedback, becoming harsher in their assessments of later
transactions (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). Empirically, the probability of re-
ceiving a negative feedback increases immediately following the receipt of one
(Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010). There are several possible explanations besides ston-
ing, including slipping (the first and subsequent negatives were both the result of
the same decline in seller quality) and slacking (the seller provides lower quality
because of receiving the first negative). By modeling the different but overlapping
time windows in which these different explanations would operate, Khopkar, Li,
and Resnick (2005) showed that some of the effect is indeed due to stoning. This
line of work does not address the role of feedback reciprocation between partners
to a given transaction.
2In another context, Wikipedia has a “welcoming committee” in charge of greeting new mem-
bers, introducing the community’s policies, guidelines, and social norms to them (Wikipedia, 2010).
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A few studies have provided empirical evidence for the existence of strategic
feedback reciprocation by exploring the correlations between buyers’ and sellers’
feedback timing (Bolton et al., 2009, Dellarocas and Wood, 2008, Resnick and
Zeckhauser, 2002), but none of these studies offers an estimate of the prevalence of
strategic feedback reciprocation. Bolton et al. (2009) also conducted human-subject
experiments to compare the effects of various feedback provision mechanisms on
the efficiency of the electronic market.
Dellarocas and Wood (2008), hereafter DW, is closest in spirit to our anal-
ysis. DW have two main results: a feedback bias result — traders report differ-
ent transaction outcomes (positive, neutral, and negative) with different probabili-
ties, leading to biases in the aggregated probabilities of various outcomes — and
a feedback reciprocation result — that feedback received increases the probability
of feedback giving. Like DW, we identified the existence of feedback reciprocation
among eBay traders. We go further and calculate the magnitude of reciprocation,
and we also measure the extent to which some observable factors influence traders’
choices to strategically reciprocate feedback.
One key difference between our models is that we make different assump-
tions on how the timing of the first feedback affects the likelihood that the receiver
reciprocates (i.e., changes her action, providing a feedback that she otherwise would
not have.) We assume the proportion of reciprocators in the population is unaffected
by the timing of the partner’s feedback, whereas in DW’s model, the number of re-
ciprocators declines the longer the partner waits to provide the first feedback. In
both models, there are fewer people left to go second the longer it takes for the first
feedback to arrive, because more of those who were going to give feedback whether
they received it or not will already have given feedback. In our model, the number
of people who change their action to one of feedback giving is unaffected by when
the partner provides feedback.
Another major difference between our models is that our method does not
require a parametric assumption on how the receipt of the first feedback affects the
timing distribution of the second feedback. DW estimate whether there is recipro-
cation by estimating whether receiving feedback increases the partner’s subsequent
hazard rate for a particular time-to-feedback distribution (Dellarocas and Wood,
2008, Section 4.1.2).3 By contrast, we make parametric assumptions only about
the timing distribution of feedbacks when the partner does not give feedback. From
that, we estimate the total probability mass of feedback expected to be given after
the partner’s feedback, without making a parametric assumption about its timing
distribution.
3The hazard rate h(t) of a failure time distribution F(t) is defined as the rate of an event occurring
given that it didn’t happen in the past. That is, h(t) = F ′(t)/(1−F(t)).
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One benefit of our approach is that we are then able to estimate how much
various observable factors affect the prevalence of a feedback reciprocation strat-
egy. In particular, we estimate how much the traders’ prior feedback profiles, and
the item price, affect the traders’ feedback giving strategy choices. In principle,
DW’s model could be extended for similar analyses, but it would be less straight-
forward to interpret. Instead of estimating the impact of a one dollar increase in
item price on the percentage of buyers pursuing a reciprocation strategy, the natu-
ral extension of DW’s model would yield an estimated impact on the hazard rate.
For a particular time of first feedback, this could be rolled up into a total expected
number of extra (reciprocating) second feedbacks, but not an estimated impact that
is independent of the time of the first feedback.
3 Model Description
3.1 Feedback outcomes and strategies
We do not observe eBay traders’ feedback provision strategies (that is, their inter-
nal mental plans), only their observable feedback-giving actions. All transactions
on eBay result in one of the following five outcomes in terms of feedback provi-
sion: No Feedback, only the seller gives feedback (Seller Only), only the buyer
gives feedback (Buyer Only), the seller gives feedback first and the buyer next
(Seller First), or the buyer gives feedback first and the seller next (Buyer First).
Any distribution of unobserved strategies would generate a distribution of these five
observable outcomes. We develop an estimation strategy that allows us to econo-
metrically identify the latent (unobservable) distribution of strategy choices, given
the observable outcomes.
We posit that each trader adopts, on each transaction, one of three strategies:
abstain from giving feedback (N), give unconditionally (Y), or reciprocate (R). Y
means that the player gives feedback on the transaction regardless of whether the
partner does. R means that the player gives feedback on that transaction only if,
and only after, the partner does.
In our stochastic model, we express buyers’ and sellers’ strategies in prob-
ability terms. Let Rg denote the probability that a trader with role R ∈ {B,S} plays
strategy g ∈ {y,r,n}. For example By is the probability that a Buyer plays strategy
Y of giving feedback unconditionally. Thus, we can think of (By,Br,Bn) as a mixed
strategy that a buyer will follow on a particular transaction. The mix may depend on
the item price, the number of prior feedbacks each partner has received, and many
unobserved and unmodeled characteristics of the transaction and the buyer.
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Outcome Buyer Strategy Seller Strategy
No Feedback N or R N or R
Seller Only N Y
Buyer Only Y N
Seller First Y or R Y
Buyer First Y Y or R
Table 1: Mapping Strategies To Feedback Outcomes
Intuitively from Table 1 it is clearly not possible to identify statistically the
prevalence of the three strategies merely from observing which of the five feedback
outcomes is realized after a transaction. Immediately, from the first row, if no feed-
back was provided by either the seller or the buyer, we know that both chose to
either abstain or reciprocate, but we cannot tell which. However, in some trans-
actions we can identify the strategy from the outcome. For example, if only the
seller (buyer) gave feedback (second and third rows), it must have been that the
seller (buyer) chose the give unconditionally strategy, and the buyer (seller) choose
to abstain. Last, if both the seller and the buyer gave feedback, with one first and
the other later (fourth and fifth rows), we can infer the strategy of only one of them:
the first giver must have chosen to give unconditionally, but the second could have
chosen either an unconditional giving strategy Y (but happened to act slower than
the first provider), or a reciprocation strategy R.
3.2 Feedback timing
Although we cannot uniquely identify strategies from outcomes alone, we have
more information available to us: we have the time at which feedback was provided.
In our dataset, for each feedback we observe the time at which it was given, denoted
by ts if given by the seller and tb if by the buyer, expressed as offsets or time elapsed
from the close of bidding on the auction of the item. This information is sufficient
to enable us to identify the strategies. For example, notice that the probability of
observing an outcome in which both provide feedback, but the buyer gives first,
depends on the timing:
Pr(Buyer First) = By ·Sy ·Pr(ts > tb|By,Sy)+BySr, (1)
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where ts and tb are the time at which the seller and the buyer give feedback respec-
tively. Thus, if we could estimate Pr(ts > tb|By,Sy), it would help in identifying the
quantities By, Sy, and Sr.
Conditional on the trader’s role, r ∈ {b,s}, and her strategy choice, g ∈
{y,r}, we assume her time of feedback, tr, follows a distribution described by the
probability density function frg(tr). For example, for a seller who plays the un-
conditional strategy Y, the probability that she gives feedback at time ts is fsy(ts).
We assume the timing distributions of both buyers’ and sellers’ feedback are log-
normal, and write the feedback timing distribution for sellers playing the Y strat-
egy as fsy(ts) = LNORM(ts), and similarly, for buyers playing the Y strategy as
fby(tb) = LNORM(tb).4 We can obtain an unbiased estimate for fsy ( fby) using only
observations with the Seller (Buyer) Only outcome.
In order to provide intuitions on how we use feedback timing to separately
identify unconditional feedback givers and reciprocators, we illustrate our model of
feedback timing in Figure 1. Imagine a dataset containing lots of transactions with
the buyer giving feedback first, all at time tb. Some of the sellers who subsequently
gave feedback were following an unconditional strategy Y, while other may have
been following a reciprocation strategy R. For those following strategy Y, absent
buyer feedback the probability density of seller feedback at time ts is fsy(ts). Even
with the buyer feedback, among sellers following strategy Y, behavior before time
tb should follow the same distribution, and thus a fraction α = Fsy(tb) should have
given feedback before tb, and only a fraction (1−α) are left to give feedback after
tb. In other words, Pr(ts > tb|By,Sy) = 1−α = 1−Fsy(tb). If there were no sellers
following reciprocation strategy R, and we had estimates of By and Sy, the overall
probability of the buyer giving feedback first, at time tb, would be By fby(tb)Sy(1−
α). If the dataset shows that the probability of a seller giving feedback after tb is
greater than Sy(1−α), the extra must have come from the reciprocators, shown as
the shaded area marked with Sr.
Figure 1 shows a specific case with Buyer First outcome, in which the buyer
gives feedback at time tb. In our dataset, tb, as well as ts, can vary across the whole
time axis, e.g., t
′
b in Figure 1, and we do not have the luxury of many transactions
for each particular value of tb. Using the same logic illustrated in Figure 1, however,
any values of LNORM parameters defining fsy and fby will determine a likelihood
of each of the transaction observations, with their actual ts and tb when feedbacks
are provided. Thus, maximum likelihood estimation can be used to select LNORM
parameters that best fit the observed data.
4Section 4.2 and appendix A explore alternative functional forms besides the lognormal distri-
bution.
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Figure 1: The feedback timing model with the Buyer First outcome.
3.3 The likelihood function
With the definition of feedback outcomes, strategy space, and timing distribution
function, we construct a multinomial maximum likelihood model with simulta-
neous equations. Let θ denote the vector of parameters to be estimated, which
will be explained in section 3.4. Equation (2) is the overall likelihood function
of θ given all the observable response variables Z in our dataset. For each trans-
action i, Zi consists of the feedback provision outcome mi, mi ∈ M where M =
{No Feedback, Seller Only, Buyer Only, Seller First, Buyer First}, and the times





l(θ ;mi, tb, ts) (2)
The outcome of No Feedback is observed whenever neither the seller nor the buyer
played the Y strategy (giving unconditionally). Thus, the likelihood of θ for No
Feedback observations is,
l(θ ;No Feedback) = (1−Sy)(1−By), (3)
When the outcome of Seller Only is observed, the likelihood is
l(θ ;Seller Only, ts) = BnSy fsy(ts). (4)
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Similarly, when the outcome is Buyer Only, the likelihood is
l(θ ;Buyer Only, tb) = SnBy fby(tb). (5)
If the outcome of Buyer First is observed, the likelihood is as follows,
l(θ ;Buyer First, tb, ts) = (6)









where term A contains the probability that the buyer was playing the strategy Y
(give feedback unconditionally), and that he chooses this particular time, tb, to give
feedback; Terms B and D contain the probabilities that the seller might be playing
the Y strategy and the R strategy respectively. Term C specifies the probability that
if the seller is playing the Y strategy, her time of feedback happens to be later than
the buyer’s. Using Fsy to denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function
of fsy, we can write the Term C as:
Pr(ts > tb|By,Sy) = 1−Fsy(tb) (7)
Similarly, if the outcome of Seller First is observed, the likelihood is as follows,
l(θ ;Seller First, tb, ts) = Sy fsy(ts)(ByPr(tb > ts|By,Sy)+Br) , (8)
where Pr(tb > ts|By,Sy) = 1−Fby(ts).
3.4 Functional form assumptions
To estimate parametrically the probabilities of trader i playing each of the three
strategies, we make the assumption that her probabilities of choosing any one of
the three strategies are governed by multinomial logistic distributions:
Byi =
eβyXi




1+ eβyXi + eβrXi
,
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Syi =
eθyXi




1+ eθyXi + eθrXi
,
where Xi is the vector of independent variables that we will later use in the regres-
sion. Bni and Sni can be derived from the above expressions.
3.5 Model validation
To validate the mathematical model and our STATA code, we conducted Monte
Carlo simulations. We generated datasets according to our functional form assump-
tions and a set of arbitrarily chosen parameters. See appendix C for the true values
of all the parameters used in the simulation, and the estimates for these parame-
ters found using our model. Summarizing our simulation results, the distribution
of simulation errors is quite close to the predicted distribution. In the last column
of Table 14 we report the errors in units of standard deviations, and in Figure 6 we
plot the cumulative distribution of these errors against the asymptotic normal distri-
bution the Monte Carlo should generate. The match is quite good, and there are no
outliers. We conclude that our model is well identified and correctly programmed.
4 Data Set
We derived our sample from three master datasets provided by eBay:
1. Items Dataset: contains transactional data for all the items listed for sale on
eBay from February 1st 1999 to June 30th 1999.
2. Feedback Dataset: contains all feedback data up to May 31st 1999.
3. Users Dataset: contains the id and registration dates for all the users who
registered before June 30th 1999.
Some buyer-seller pairs conduct multiple transactions, and feedback giving
patterns may be quite different on subsequent transactions than on initial transac-
tions, especially since eBay did not count multiple feedbacks from the same partner
in a trader’s score, thus potentially changing the incentive to provide multiple feed-
backs to the same partner. Moreover, at the time of our dataset, eBay did not require
10
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that all feedback be tied to a specific transaction. Thus, we chose the buyer-seller
partnership’s first transaction as the unit of analysis.
We extracted all the items listed for auction during the first week of March
1999 and eventually purchased, involving buyer-seller partnerships that had not
conducted a prior transaction and had no prior feedback. This initial sample con-
tains 959,657 items.5
The auction of an item ends with a winning bidder, whose bid is higher than
other bidders’ bids and the reservation price set by the seller. From our perspective,
this marks the start of a transaction.
At the time of these transactions, eBay opened the feedback channels for
both buyer and seller to rate each other as soon as the transactions started. Each
feedback contained two parts: an indicator (+1 for positive, -1 for negative, or 0 for
neutral) and an optional text comment. We treated the first feedback, if any, from
buyer to seller and vice versa, that occurred within 60 days of the transaction, as
feedback for that first transaction between partners.6
4.1 Sampling
The two-sided nature of the feedback systems we study poses particular challenges
for data sampling. The unit of analysis in our maximum likelihood model is a
transaction, and we assumed above that feedback strategy selection for all the trans-
actions in the dataset are pairwise independent, conditional on the item price and
feedback profiles. Yet suppose that each trader (buyer or seller) has an idiosyncratic
individual propensity to choose one of the three feedback strategies (always give,
never give, reciprocate). Then if a trader participates in multiple transactions, these
transactions will be inter-dependent, thus violating the independence assumption.
We present below a method that yields consistent estimates in the face of this
multiple-transaction, fixed-effect problem. Before we do, we explain why a couple
of other seemingly natural methods do not work. One is to randomly select one
from all transactions in which a given buyer participates, losing some observations
but eliminating buyer interdependence. Unfortunately, since transactions involve
trader pairs, this method will not, in general, eliminate all multiple transactions for
5Our transaction data began only in February 1999, while our feedback history goes back to the
beginning of eBay. There is a chance that we included transactions that were not the first for a
partnership, if the previous transactions were more than one month prior to our extraction window
and no feedback had ever been given between the partners.
6It is possible that some partnerships conducted additional transactions beyond the first and pro-
vided feedback for subsequent transactions but not the first. Our data set would incorrectly attribute
the first feedback with the first transaction. We believe that occurred infrequently and would intro-
duce only random error, not systematic bias.
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some sellers. Further, if multiple-transaction buyers are matched approximately
randomly to sellers, then this sampling method will disproportionately eliminate
altogether sellers who trade infrequently, biasing the resulting sample of sellers.
Sampling both sides to eliminate multiple transactions for both buyers and sellers
simply exacerbates the second problem.
Another approach is common: to specify a maximum likelihood model that
explicitly accounts for the possibility of fixed effects, estimating them as nuisance
parameters, to yield consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. However, in
our sample of 959,657 items, there are 394,997 distinct buyers, and 133,697 distinct
sellers. Thus, on average buyers in our sample appear in about two transactions,
and sellers appear in about seven. Indeed, 50% of the traders had no more than two
transactions, and 90% had no more than nine transactions. For most traders, this
longitudinal dimension is much too small to rely on asymptotics for consistency.
Greene (2004) found that with such a small number of repeated observations per
agent, both fixed and random effects models produce results that are more biased
than those from a pooled model in which trader-specific effects are ignored.
We now describe our method. We constructed two sub-samples, one a
buyer-unique sub-sample containing a single randomly drawn transaction for each
of the 394,997 unique buyers, and the other a seller-unique sub-sample containing
a single randomly drawn transaction for each of the 133,697 unique sellers. We
then estimate the model twice, once for each sub-sample. We obtain estimates of
the parameters associated with buyer behavior from the buyer-unique sub-sample
(discarding the estimates of the seller parameters), and we obtain seller parameter
estimates from the seller-unique sub-sample.
Our sampling method ensures a representative sample. The buyer (seller)
sub-sample is a representative cross-section sample of the buyer (seller) population.
More importantly, the sampling method ensures unbiased parameter estimates for
the uniquely-sampled side, despite potential biases in the parameter estimates for
the other side. For example, consider the seller-unique sub-sample. For any fixed
buyer parameters, the likelihood function is maximized at the same set of seller
parameters.7 Thus, because the seller-unique sub-sample has independence among
seller transactions, we get an unbiased estimate of the seller parameters, even if the
buyer parameter estimates are not accurate due to dependence among transactions
involving the same buyer.
This method may not be efficient, compared to a hypothetical panel model,
because we discard many observations. A panel model with fixed or random ef-
7One can easily verify this by taking the partial derivative of the log-likelihood function with
respect to any seller parameter: no buyer parameters appear. This property is due to our assump-
tion that in any transaction the buyer and the seller independently choose their feedback provision
strategies.
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fects, however, is not suited to our dataset, as argued above. Fortunately, with our
rather large dataset, we can be somewhat profligate and still obtain rather precise
estimates.
4.2 Model fit
We tested three different parametric functional forms, i.e., Lognormal, Gamma,
and Weibull distributions, to estimate fsy and fby. The observed distribution and the
estimated distributions using these three functional forms are graphed in Figure 2
for sellers and Figure 3 for buyers.
From a visual comparison of the estimated and the observed distributions,
we believe that the lognormal model fits the observed distributions better than the
other two. However, the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the null hy-
potheses that the observed and the predicted timing distributions are the same, for
all three functional forms and for both timing distributions, i.e., fsy and fby, each
at a statistically significant level (p-value < 0.001). This is understandable because
with a large dataset (more than one hundred thousand observations), almost any
deviation from a hypothesis will be statistically significant. Thus the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test results are overly precise for determining the reasonableness of the
goodness of fit of our model.
We also conducted robustness test of our results using all three distribution
functions for feedback timing (See appendix A for details). As varying the func-
tional forms did not lead to qualitatively different results, we only report our results
estimated using the lognormal distribution.
As a sanity check on the assumption that receiving feedback triggers recip-
rocation, Figure 4 and 5 plot the actual timing of feedback, for sellers and buyers
respectively, after receipt of a feedback on day 15 and 35, as compared to the ex-
pected feedback if there were no reciprocators. Both show spikes in feedback giving
the day or two immediately after receiving feedback. These spikes could be due,
in part or in full, to a reminding effect. That is, people who would have given
feedback anyway may do so earlier, reminded by the event of receiving feedback.
Reciprocation effects cannot be read off simply from these graphs: we estimate the
reciprocation effect through our model, by comparing the area under the curve to
the right of the first feedback event to the expected area, rather than examining the
shape of those curves. The existence of the spike, however, provides clear evidence
that receipt of the first feedback has some effect on the other party’s feedback ac-
tions, and thus it is reasonable to attribute modeled changes in the second player’s
actions to the effect of the first party’s feedback.
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Feedback timing distribution: Seller Only
Figure 2: Sellers’ feedback time distribution estimated using all the observations of
























Feedback timing distribution: Buyer Only
Figure 3: Buyers’ feedback time distribution estimated using all the observations
of Buyer Only outcomes of our dataset.
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Figure 4: The distributions of seller feedback timing when buyers gave feedback
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Figure 5: The distributions of buyer feedback timing when sellers gave feedback
on day 15 and day 35.
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Buyer Unique Seller Unique
Outcomes # of Occurrences % # of Occurrences %
No Feedback 143,080 36.22% 45,927 34.35 %
Seller Only 73,276 18.55% 22,788 17.04 %
Buyer Only 40,669 10.3% 15,966 11.94 %
Seller First 90,564 22.92% 32,032 23.96 %
Buyer First 47,408 12% 16,984 12.71 %
Total 394,997 100% 133,697 100 %
Table 2: Distribution of feedback provision outcomes.
Roles Mean(Std. Err.) Median
Buyer 26(66) 6
Seller 78(155) 26
Table 3: Distribution of prior feedbacks received.
5 Empirical Results
Table 2 shows the distribution of feedback outcomes in both data sets: buyer-unique
and seller-unique. Overall, about 35% of the transactions received no feedback;
about 18% received feedback only from the seller; about 10% received feedback
only from the buyer; and the remaining 35% received feedback from both parties.
Table 3 shows the distribution of prior feedbacks received by the traders. Buyers
have a mean of 26 feedbacks (with a standard error of 66), and a median of 6; sellers
have a mean of 78 (with a standard error of 155), and a median of 26. Overall, sell-
ers have more feedbacks than buyers. The distributions for both buyers and sellers
are skewed: both distributions contain many traders with low feedback scores, and
a few traders with high feedback scores. Note that when counting the total num-
ber of prior feedbacks for a trader, we followed eBay’s practice (when it calculates
feedback scores): we consider only the first feedback between a trading pair.
To study determinants of traders’ choice of feedback provision strategies,
we constructed six independent variables (see Table 4) to describe the observable
context of the traders’ transactions. We expect that the mix of feedback provi-
sion strategies will depend on the reputation profiles of the participants, since at
various stages of a trader’s reputation profile development, her knowledge of the
system varies, as well as her needs to maximize gains from her reputation profile.
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Variable name Definition
newbuyer 1 if a buyer has received fewer than 5 feedbacks, and 0 otherwise
newseller 1 if a seller has received fewer than 5 feedbacks, and 0 otherwise
newint an interaction term, equal to newbuyer×newseller
ln f bbuyerr the logarithm of the total number of feedback scores received by
a buyer ( f bbuyerr) plus one, thus ln f bbuyerr = log( f bbuyerr+
1)
ln f bsellerr the logarithm of the total number of feedback scores re-
ceived by a seller ( f bsellerr) plus one, thus ln f bsellerr =
log( f bsellerr +1)
lnprice log(the sale price o f the item)
Table 4: Independent variables in the regression analyses.
To elaborate, we first classify traders into two distinct categories: new and expe-
rienced traders. New traders are those who have very little experience with the
feedback system, reflected in the small number (e.g., 0 ∼ 4 ) of feedbacks they have
previously received. After participating in a few more transactions and receiving
more than five feedbacks, we classify them as “experienced”. The dummy vari-
ables newbuyer and newseller take the value 1 if a buyer or a seller is new, and
zero otherwise. 8 newint is an interaction term of newbuyer and newseller to sep-
arately identify cases in which both the seller and the buyer are new. We also con-
structed two continuous variables to proxy for the traders’ experience, ln f bbuyerr
and ln f bsellerr. They are the logarithm of the total number of prior feedbacks re-
ceived in the trader’s life time with eBay, for buyers and sellers respectively.9 Last,
we allow the logarithm of the price of the item being sold, lnprice, to be a factor in
both the buyer’s and the seller’s strategy choices.
8The choice of five as a threshold is arbitrary. We tested the sensitivity of our results to this
threshold, and found that they are sensitive, but in the direction that reinforces our conclusion: new-
ness matters, and experience effects show up after a modest number of feedbacks (see appendix B).
9To operationalize these two variables, we used ln f bbuyerr = log( f bbuyerr +1), and similarly
for the seller ln f bsellerr = log( f bsellerr + 1), to avoid the problem of an undefined logarithm of
zero.
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Dependent Var. Independent Var. Coef. Std. Err. z P-value
By newbuyer -0.113 0.019 -6.040 0.000
newseller -0.282 0.024 -11.780 0.000
newint -0.042 0.028 -1.500 0.134
lnfbbuyerr 0.194 0.005 37.540 0.000
lnfbsellerr -0.03 0.003 -8.380 0.000
lnprice 0.045 0.003 13.480 0.000
intercept -0.480 0.025 -19.200 0.000
Br newbuyer 0.18 0.036 4.910 0.000
newseller -0.286 0.046 -6.160 0.000
newint 0.01 0.054 0.160 0.871
lnfbbuyerr 0.098 0.010 9.670 0.000
lnfbsellerr -0.069 0.006 -11.640 0.000
lnprice -0.047 0.006 -7.290 0.000
intercept -0.310 0.048 -6.480 0.000
Sy newbuyer -0.280 0.036 -7.890 0.000
newseller -0.086 0.034 -2.540 0.011
newint -0.117 0.040 -2.950 0.003
lnfbbuyerr 0.076 0.007 10.450 0.000
lnfbsellerr 0.201 0.007 27.610 0.000
lnprice -0.045 0.006 -8.020 0.000
intercept -0.268 0.043 -6.190 0.000
Sr newbuyer -0.308 0.08 -4.000 0.000
newseller 0.494 0.069 7.130 0.000
newint 0.089 0.086 1.030 0.303
lnfbbuyerr 0.030 0.014 2.070 0.039
lnfbsellerr 0.204 0.015 13.870 0.000
lnprice 0.102 0.012 8.700 0.000
intercept -1.60 0.092 -17.260 0.000
Table 5: Estimated coefficients.
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Role and Strategy Probabilities at median Probabilities at mean
By 0.38 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.43 (0.002)∗∗∗
Br 0.23 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.22 (0.002)∗∗∗
Bn 0.39 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.35 (0.002)∗∗∗
Sy 0.47 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.52 (0.002)∗∗∗
Sr 0.20 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.21 (0.003)∗∗∗
Sn 0.32 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.26 (0.003)∗∗∗
Independent Var. Values
newbuyer = 0 newbuyer = 0
newseller = 0 newseller = 0
newint = 0 newint = 0
f bbuyerr = 6 (median) f bbuyerr = 26 (mean)
f bsellerr = 26 (median) f bsellerr = 78 (mean)
price = 45.43 (mean) price = 45.43 (mean)
Table 6: Estimated probabilities of each strategy being adopted by typical sellers
and buyers.
Note: Asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance. *** means statistically
significant at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The numbers in parentheses are
the standard deviations.
In Table 5 we present the coefficients on these independent variables esti-
mated using our maximum likelihood model for four dependent variables: By, Br,
Sy, and Sr (Bn and Sn can be derived from these four variables). In the subsequent
columns, we list their standard errors, z values, and the p-values of two-sided tests
that they are not different from zero. Most estimates of the coefficients are sig-
nificantly different from zero at 1% level. The coefficients in this table are hard
to interpret, however, as they do not easily translate into marginal effects. In the
following sections we evaluate the marginal effects of the independent variables,
contingent on scenarios in which the independent variables take on various values.
5.1 Distribution of feedback provision strategies
In Table 6 we report our estimates of the probabilities of buyers or sellers play-
ing any of the three hypothesized strategies, evaluated at the median and the mean
number of feedbacks for each trader type. The top half of the table contains the
estimated probabilities and the bottom half of the table contains the values of the
independent variables at which these probabilities are evaluated. All the estimated
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Ŝy −Sy 0.12(0.006)∗∗∗ 0.12(0.005)∗∗∗
Ŝr −Sr −0.06(0.012)∗∗∗ −0.06(0.007)∗∗∗
Ŝn −Sn −0.06(0.012)∗∗∗ −0.06(0.007)∗∗∗
Independent Var. Values
newseller = 1 newseller = 1
f bsellerr = 0 f bsellerr = 0̂newseller = 0 ̂newseller = 0̂f bsellerr = 5 ̂f bsellerr = 5
newbuyer = 1 newbuyer = 0
f bbuyerr = 0 f bbuyerr = 26 (mean)
price = 45.43 (mean) price = 45.43 (mean)
Table 7: Seller behavior changes when new sellers become experienced.
probabilities shown in the table are statistically significantly different than zero at
the 1% level. As we expected, a significant proportion of sellers and buyers are
feedback reciprocators, and all three hypothesized strategies are being adopted for
a substantial proportion of transactions. At the median levels (a buyer with a score
of 6 buying a $45 item from a seller with score 26), there is a 38% probability the
buyer will give feedback unconditionally and 39% probability she will abstain from
giving feedback, with the remaining 23% probability she will be a reciprocator. On
the other hand, at the median levels, 47% of sellers give feedback unconditionally;
32% abstain; and 20% reciprocate.
5.2 Strategy choices
Traders may use different feedback strategies at various stages of their career. They
may also behave differently when facing different types of trading partners. In this
section, we explore how traders’ strategy choices vary based on the trading context.
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B̂y −By 0.1(0.005)∗∗∗ 0.1(0.003)∗∗∗
B̂r −Br −0.04(0.009)∗∗∗ −0.04(0.004)∗∗∗
B̂n −Bn −0.06(0.009)∗∗∗ −0.06(0.003)∗∗∗
Independent Var. Values
newbuyer = 1 newbuyer = 1
f bbuyerr = 0 f bbuyerr = 0̂newbuyer = 0 ̂newbuyer = 0̂f bbuyerr = 5 ̂f bbuyerr = 5
newseller = 1 newseller = 0
f bsellerr = 0 f bsellerr = 78 (mean)
price = 45.43 (mean) price = 45.43 (mean)
Table 8: Buyer behavior changes when new buyers become experienced.
5.2.1 New traders become experienced
We compare new sellers’ and experienced sellers’ strategy choices in Table 7. The
variables with hats indicate that they are about the experienced sellers, and those
without hats are about new sellers. We consider these comparisons in two scenar-
ios, one in which sellers face new buyers (newbuyer = 1, f bbuyerr = 0), and the
other in which they face experienced buyers (newbuyer = 0, f bbuyerr = 26, where
26 is the mean of f bbuyerr). The results are quite similar in these two scenarios
(compare across the two columns in Table 7), so we focus on one: sellers facing
new buyers (the first column of results). In exactly the same format, Table 8 shows
the comparisons of new buyers’ and experienced buyers’ strategy choices. Again
we focus on the first column of the results in Table 8.
We found that the changes in behavior among sellers and buyers as they
gain their first few feedbacks follow the same pattern: a reduction in the use of the
“abstain” and “reciprocate” strategies, accompanied by a strong increase in “give
unconditionally”. The effects are larger in absolute and relative terms for sellers.
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As new traders become experienced, they are more likely to give feedback
unconditionally (Ŝy − Sy = 0.12, one-sided test: p-value < 0.001; and B̂y −By =
0.1, one-sided test: p-value < 0.001), less likely to abstain from giving feedback
(Ŝn−Sn =−0.06 one-sided test: p-value < 0.001; B̂n−Bn =−0.06 (one-sided test:
p-value < 0.001 ), and less likely to reciprocate (Ŝr − Sr = −0.06, one-sided test:
p-value < 0.001; B̂r −Br = −0.04, one-sided test: p-value < 0.001). The prob-
ability of sellers (buyers) giving feedback unconditionally increases by 0.12 (0.1)
point, which is a 55% (43%) increase from the new sellers’ (buyers’) probability
of giving feedback unconditionally, Sy = 0.22 (By = 0.23), indicating that there
is considerable learning going on among new traders during their first few trades.
eBay provides FAQs and forums to facilitate learning. Also, the socially interactive
nature of the feedback system makes it possible for new traders to learn by doing.
Receiving feedback from one’s trading partner informs or reminds the trader about
the existence of the feedback system, and with it comes a link which guides her to
return a feedback to her partner. In addition, receiving a feedback informs one about
the social norm of feedback giving. Humans have the natural tendency to conform
to social norms (Asch, 1956, Akerlof, 1980, Bernheim, 1994). All of these reasons
point to the tendency that as new traders gain experience, they are more likely to be
unconditional-givers, and less likely to abstain from giving feedback.
We do not have a strong conjecture as to whether new traders will be more
likely to reciprocate as they become experienced. The results show that they will
not. One possible explanation is that before new traders learned how to use the feed-
back system, some of them were “passive” reciprocators who did not know how to
give feedback but were willing to reciprocate any feedback received. Some traders
who had learned how to give feedback and also that others may reciprocate their
feedback, started actively initiating feedback exchanges. Thus these reciprocators
have instead become unconditional givers.
5.2.2 How experienced traders treat new traders
In our dataset, 180,433 (46%) out of the 394,997 buyers are new buyers, and 31,609
(24%) of the 133,697 sellers are new sellers. If the social nature of the feedback
system plays a significant role in assisting new traders to learn, the speed at which
they learn apparently depends on how soon they receive feedback. From the system
designer’s point of view, if the new traders received “special treatment” by veterans,
they might learn faster. We have observed such special treatment in other commu-
nities, such as Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2010). On eBay, do experienced traders also
take up the responsibility of teaching new members? If so, they would be more
likely to give feedback unconditionally to new traders than to other veterans.
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f bbuyerr = 0̂newbuyer = 0̂f bbuyerr = 5
newseller = 0
f bsellerr = 78 (mean)
price = 45.43 (mean)
Table 9: Seller behavior changes when new buyers become experienced.
Table 9 and Table 10 contain our results on how traders behavior changes
when their partners’ reputation profile vary. Again, variables with hats indicate
that they are for experienced traders. For instance, Sy(B̂) denotes the probability
of a seller giving feedback unconditionally when facing an experienced buyer, and
Sr(B) denotes the probability of a seller playing the reciprocate strategy when facing
a new buyer.
The results do not bear out our conjecture that there may be some “indoctri-
nation” going on among the traders. We found experienced traders do not educate
newbies by giving them more feedbacks; rather, they give newbies fewer. Both
sellers and buyers are more likely to give feedback unconditionally to experienced
traders than to newbies: Sy(B̂)− Sy(B) = 0.07 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001)
and By(Ŝ)−By(S) = 0.04 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001); they are less likely
to abstain when trading with experienced traders: Sn(B̂)− Sn(B) = −0.08 (one-
sided test: p-value < 0.001) and Bn(Ŝ)−Bn(S) = −0.05 (one-sided test: p-value
< 0.001). One possible explanation is that for a considerable proportion of experi-
enced traders, the purpose of giving feedback unconditionally is to initiate feedback
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f bsellerr = 0̂newseller = 0̂f bsellerr = 5
newbuyerer = 0
f bbuyererr = 26 (mean)
price = 45.43 (mean)
Table 10: Buyer behavior changes when new sellers become experienced.
exchanges. As new members are less familiar with the system, they may be less
likely to “return the favor”. As a result, experienced traders do not have sufficient
incentives to give feedback to new traders.
Both veteran sellers and buyers are slightly more likely to reciprocate as
their partners become experienced: Sr(B̂)− Sr(B) = 0.02 (one-sided test: p-value
< 0.036) and Br(Ŝ)−Br(S) = 0.007 (not statistically significantly different from
zero, but the change is in the right direction).
5.2.3 Gaining experience
Once an experienced seller has accumulated a substantial number of feedbacks,
the marginal benefit of receiving a positive feedback diminishes, while the damage
caused by a negative feedback becomes salient. To avoid receiving negative feed-
back, sellers may choose never to give feedback first, which means she would either
reciprocate or abstain. In repeated interactions with the same buyers or in situations
in which the seller’s past feedback giving behavior with other buyers is observable,
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establishing a reputation as a reciprocator rather than an abstainer would help the
seller create some reward and retaliation power. Taken together, we expect sellers
with higher number of feedbacks to be more likely to reciprocate and less likely to
give feedback unconditionally. For the buyers, we do not have a strong conjecture
as to how they will behave differently as they gain experience.
In Table 11 we report the marginal effects on feedback giving evaluated at
the sample medians and means of f bbuyerr and f bsellerr. Each marginal effect
is reported in terms of probability on the scale from 0 to 100 percentage points.
For example, f bsellerr on Sy — the effect of the total number of prior feedbacks
received by the seller on her probability of playing strategy Y — is 0.11 percentage
points with a standard deviation of 0.01, which reads: as a seller receives one more
feedback, the probability that she gives feedback unconditionally increases by 0.11
percentage points, all else being equal.
As expected, we found sellers are more likely to reciprocate when they gain
experience: f bsellerr on Sr = 0.05 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001) at the median
level and f bsellerr on Sr = 0.01 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001) at the mean
level. Thus, for a seller with a median (mean) number of feedbacks, adding 100
more feedbacks increases the probability that he reciprocates by 5 (1) percentage
points. To our surprise, we found sellers are more likely to give feedback uncon-
ditionally as they gain experience ( f bsellerr on Sy = 0.11, one-sided test: p-value
< 0.001). That is, for every 100 feedbacks a seller receives, she is 11 percentage
points more likely to give feedback unconditionally. This effect is smaller when
evaluated at the mean level, but still significant: f bsellerr on Sy = 0.03, one-sided
test: p-value < 0.001.10 These increases in Sy and Sr come from a reduction in Sn:
f bsellerr on Sn =−0.16 (or −0.05 evaluated at the means). Taken together, as ex-
perienced sellers receive even more feedback, they are more likely to give feedback
unconditionally or reciprocate, and less likely to abstain from giving feedback.
Turning to the effect of increasing feedback on experienced buyers, we
found buyers are more likely to give feedback unconditionally as they gain more
experience: f bbuyerr on By = 0.53 at the median level (one-sided test: p-value
< 0.001) and f bbuyerr on By = 0.14 at the mean level (one-sided test: p-value
< 0.001). That is, buyers with 16 rather than 6 feedbacks go from 38% to 43.3%
probability of choosing strategy Y of giving feedback unconditionally.11 At the
mean levels, buyers with 36 rather than 26 feedback go from 43% to 44.4% proba-
bility of choosing strategy Y .
10We do not mean to claim that the estimated marginal effect holds constant over a range of
experience from 26 to 126 feedbacks; rather, we are simply rescaling the coefficient magnitude to
improve comprehension of the effects.
11Again, this is not quite true, since the marginal effect does not hold constant over the range from
6 to 16 feedbacks.
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Marginal effect Evaluated at median Evaluated at mean
f bsellerr on Sy 0.11(0.01)∗∗∗ 0.03(< 0.00)∗∗∗
f bsellerr on Sr 0.05(0.01)∗∗∗ 0.01(< 0.00)∗∗∗
f bsellerr on Sn −0.16(0.01)∗∗∗ −0.05(< 0.00)∗∗∗
f bbuyerr on By 0.53(0.02)∗∗∗ 0.14(< 0.00)∗∗∗
f bbuyerr on Br 0.01(0.02) −0.01(0.01)
f bbuyerr on Bn −0.54(0.02)∗∗∗ −0.14(< 0.00)∗∗∗
f bbuyerr on Sy 0.23(0.02)∗∗∗ 0.06(0.01)∗∗∗
f bbuyerr on Sr −0.03(0.03) −0.01(0.01)∗
f bbuyerr on Sn −0.19(0.03)∗∗∗ −0.04(0.01)∗∗∗
f bsellerr on By −0.00(< 0.00) −0.00(< 0.00)
f bsellerr on Br −0.04(< 0.00)∗∗∗ −0.01(< 0.00)∗∗∗
f bsellerr on Bn 0.04(< 0.00)∗∗∗ 0.01(< 0.00)∗∗∗
price on Sy −0.05(< 0.00)∗∗∗ −0.05(< 0.00)∗∗∗
price on Sr 0.05(< 0.00)∗∗∗ 0.05(< 0.00)∗∗∗
price on Sn 0.00(< 0.00) −0.00(< 0.00)
price on By 0.03(< 0.00)∗∗∗ 0.03(< 0.00)∗∗∗
price on Br −0.03(< 0.00)∗∗∗ −0.03(< 0.00)∗∗∗
price on Bn −0.01(< 0.00)∗∗∗ −0.01(< 0.00)∗∗∗
Independent Var. Values
newbuyer = 0 newbuyer = 0
newseller = 0 newseller = 0
f bbuyerr = 6 (median) f bbuyerr = 26 (mean)
f bsellerr = 26 (median) f bsellerr = 78 (mean)
price = 45.43 (mean) price = 45.43 (mean)
Table 11: Marginal effects on feedback giving evaluated at the sample medians and
means of the number of feedbacks received by buyers and sellers.
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5.2.4 How experienced traders are treated
We expect that experienced traders receive varying treatments based on the number
of feedbacks they have accumulated. For example, as experienced buyers gather
more (positive) feedback, they may seem more trustworthy as feedback givers. We
expect that sellers are more willing to initiate a feedback exchange with trustworthy
buyers.
As for experienced sellers, the more feedbacks they have, we would expect
the lower the probability that they will receive feedback. Suppose seller A has 2000
feedbacks, while seller B has 100. Although both are experienced by our definition,
we suspect that a buyer may be more likely to give feedback to B than to A, the
reason being that the buyer feels her “vote” counts more for B than for A.
We did find that sellers are more likely to give feedback to buyers with more
feedback: f bbuyerr on Sy = 0.23 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001) at the median
level, and f bbuyerr on Sy = 0.06 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001) at the mean
level. That is, for 10 new feedbacks a typical buyer receives, the probability that
her partner seller gives feedback unconditionally to her increases by 2.3 percentage
points at the median level, and by 0.6 percentage points at the mean level. This
increase is mainly a decrease in Sn. Taken together, increasingly experienced buyers
are more likely to always receive feedback from sellers. This result is consistent
with our earlier results on how sellers treat buyers when we divide buyers into two
groups: new versus experienced.
We did not find strong evidence to support our conjecture that buyers are
less likely to give feedback unconditionally as sellers accumulate more experience:
f bsellerr on By = 0.00. We did find (evaluating at the medians) that as sellers
accumulate more feedback, buyers are less likely to reciprocate and more likely
to abstain from giving them feedback: f bsellerr on Br = −0.04 (one-sided test:
p-value < 0.001) and f bsellerr on Bn = 0.04 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001).12
It appears our conjecture is in the right direction: buyers stopped bothering about
giving feedback (or returning feedback) to highly experienced sellers, but the effects
are quite small.
5.2.5 Item value
Items with different values may spark different feedback behavior. We know that
buyers pay more attention to their sellers’ feedback profile when buying higher
valued items (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). We suspect that buyers are more likely to give
12These results are consistent with Dellarocas and Wood (2008): buyers are more likely to give
feedback to inexperienced sellers than to experienced sellers.
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feedback unconditionally if the prices of the items are higher. Anticipating buyers’
behavior, sellers may be safer to strategically reciprocate rather than give feedback
first, to avoid negative feedback.
We did find that item value affects the strategy choices of both sellers and
buyers. Buyers are more likely to give feedback unconditionally when the price of
the item is higher: price on By = 0.03 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001). We also
found with high value items, buyers are less likely to reciprocate: price on Br =
−0.03 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001). Thus for a $100 increase in the price of
the item, the buyers are three percentage points more likely to give feedback uncon-
ditionally, and three percentage points less likely to reciprocate. On the seller side,
we found sellers are more likely to reciprocate, and less likely to give feedback un-
conditionally with higher value items: price on Sr = 0.05 (one-sided test: p-value
< 0.001), and price on Sy =−0.05 (one-sided test: p-value < 0.001). Thus with a
$100 increase in the item value, sellers are five percentage points more likely to be
reciprocators, and five percentage points less likely to give feedback uncondition-
ally. These results are consistent with findings from prior literature (Ba and Pavlou,
2002, Dellarocas and Wood, 2008): buyers are more likely to give feedback for
higher value items, and they are pickier in assessing the quality of the services for
higher value items; in response to buyers’ behavior, sellers tend to strategically hold
back their feedback to retain the option to give retaliating negative feedbacks.
6 Limitations
In our specification we assumed that buyers and sellers choose their feedback giv-
ing strategies independently, conditional on item price and feedback profiles. This
does not mean that they select actions independently: in particular when someone
chooses the reciprocation strategy, the action of giving or not giving feedback de-
pends on whether the partner does. Independent strategy choice does mean that
buyer and seller did not collude (e.g., by making an outside agreement) when se-
lecting their strategies of whether to give feedback conditionally or unconditionally.
This is a common assumption for online transactions, and is unlikely to be prob-
lematic in the case of most eBay transactions.
There is another implication of our strategy independence assumption that
may be of greater concern. Our strategy independence assumption is an assumption
that strategy selection is not conditional on variables unobserved by the econome-
trician, but observable (at least in part) by both parties.13 We may expect that strate-
gies in fact depend on such variables. For instance, a person’s decision whether to
13We use “observable in part” to refer to the case in which the two parties may observe “different”
variables, but these variables themselves have some common component, or a joint non-independent
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send feedback might depend on the other party’s timeliness in carrying out his or
her part of the transaction.
The problem can be illustrated by referring back to one of the terms that
enters our likelihood function; consider the likelihood given that the outcome of No
Feedback is observed:
l(θ ;No Feedback) = (1−Sy)(1−By), (3)
That the strategies Sy and By are chosen independently absent collusion is
not problematic. However, real users — say, sellers — might choose a “give feed-
back” strategy Sy that depends on the quality of the buyer’s performance (as in,
“give feedback always, if the buyer sends a check within three days”) or of commu-
nications between the buyer and seller (as in, “give feedback always, if the buyer
announces that he will give feedback”), and if the buyer’s strategy also depends on
some of the same variables, then the actions chosen by Sy and By may be correlated,
and our likelihood function is misspecified.
The problem of omitting correlated variables on which strategies are contin-
gent is a fundamental identification problem for all latent variable models, and is not
special to our dataset nor our specification. The empirical question is how good the
conditional independence assumption is (that is, that the econometrician observes
and conditions on all salient correlating variables). Studies of other datasets, with
different or more conditioning variables, would be valuable to test the robustness of
our main claims. All that we can say, as is usual, is that our results are conditional
on the specification, which in our case means that we assume strategy choices by
both buyer and seller are not (very much) conditional on unobservables.
Another limitation of our study pertains to our dataset. The transactions in
our dataset occurred in 1999. eBay has revised its feedback rules multiple times
over the last decade since our data collection.14 A major change occurred in May
2008, when eBay removed sellers’ ability to leave negative or neutral feedback on
buyers, to free dissatisfied buyers from fear of retaliation when they leave negative
feedback.15 Under this new rule, sellers lost their power of retaliation, which was
one of the reasons why sellers may have strategically reciprocated feedback during
the time our data were collected. We do not know how such rule revisions may have
distribution. Then, the correlated part of these two variables can lead to correlation in the actions
chosen.
14See details of these revisions at http://www2.ebay.com/aw/au/archive.shtml, retrieved on Sept
14, 2010.
15A number of measures were subsequently taken to protect sellers from buyers abusing their
power conferred by this rule change, including enabling the buyer to revise her negative or neutral
feedback if the seller managed to rectify the transaction problem. eBay also made a few other
changes in May 2008, such as reducing the 90 day window of feedback giving to 60 days.
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affected the population prevalence of eBay trader feedback provision strategies.
Our methodological contribution provides a straightforward way to measure the
effect of a rule change on feedback provision strategies using a before and after
dataset.
In May 2007, eBay introduced Detailed Seller Ratings (DSRs) which en-
abled buyers to provide feedback on “four aspects of their transaction: accuracy
of item description, communication, shipping time, and shipping and handling
charges. The rating system is based on a one to five star scale, with one star be-
ing the lowest rating and five stars being the highest.” The average ratings of a
seller on all four aspects are displayed as part of her feedback profile.16 The current
system also displays the percentage of positive feedback out of the total number of
positive and negative feedbacks received in the last 12 months.17 These changes
certainly enrich the display of the reputation profile, but the underlying mechanism
remains largely the same. As long as the number of positive, neutral, and negative
feedbacks are displayed, traders continue to care about receipt of these feedbacks
when they formulate their feedback giving strategies.
eBay has also revised its feedback removal rules. At the time of our data
collection, eBay did not allow revising feedbacks unless there was clear indication
of feedback abuse. The current policy is that buyers can revise their negative or neu-
tral feedback if the seller manages to rectify the problem that led to the feedback.
Such a policy change might affect buyers’ attitudes toward giving negative or neu-
tral feedback. We did not study the content of feedback, just strategies for whether
to provide feedback. As we discussed earlier, however, the opportunity to retaliate,
and now to revise, may affect traders’ choice of feedback provision strategies as
well.
The evolution of the rules in eBay’s feedback system reflects the fact that
these rules are important: the system managers consider it important enough to
have adjusted these rules multiple times to achieve better feedback outcomes. It
also implies that traders do respond to these rules. Given the rule changes, some
of our results may no longer hold for the current eBay feedback system. Nonethe-
less, our results continue to provide a baseline estimate of the prevalence of the
three feedback giving strategies, for comparison with other feedback systems in
other electronic markets, including today’s eBay. And perhaps equally important,
we have developed a straightforward method that can be used to identify the preva-
lence of feedback giving strategies in other data sets, under varying environments.
16See more details about DSRs at http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/detailed-seller-
ratings.html, retrieved on Sept 14, 2010.
17When the percentage of positive feedback was first introduced in March 2003, it was calculated
as the percentage of positives out of the total number of positive, neutral, and negative feedbacks. In
July 2008, eBay removed neutrals from the calculation.
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Because the feedback ecosystem is complex, no single study can account for the ef-
fects of future changes in the reputation system. Thus, having a reusable estimation
method is valuable.
7 Conclusions
We developed an econometric model to study the feedback provision strategies used
by participants in systems for bilateral interactions between strangers. We then ap-
plied our model to analyze the feedback provision strategies of eBay traders. We
hypothesized that three types of feedback provision strategies were played by the
traders: give (feedback) unconditionally, abstain (from giving feedback) uncondi-
tionally, and reciprocate. We found that all three types of strategies were being
played by the traders. In particular, in transactions in which the buyer has the me-
dian number of feedbacks among all buyers, and the seller has the median number
of feedbacks among all sellers, 38% of the buyers and 47% of the sellers give feed-
back unconditionally. This is quite high compared to theoretical predictions that the
proportion of traders (buyers or sellers) who give feedback unconditionally would
be minimal. We also found that in a substantial faction of cases, traders were strate-
gic feedback reciprocators— 23% of the buyers and 20% of the sellers. We argue
that the knowledge about the existence of these reciprocators may be a motivation
for some traders to give feedback unconditionally, as they anticipate their partners
to reciprocate. The remaining 39% of the time for buyers and 32% for sellers, the
chosen strategy is not to provide feedback, regardless of whether the partner does.
eBay traders’ feedback provision strategies evolve as they participate more
in the marketplace. Both new buyers and new sellers become more likely to give
feedback unconditionally after they experience their first few trades. Furthermore,
as experienced traders continue to trade, they are also more likely to give feedback
in general. Sellers are more likely to both reciprocate and give feedback uncondi-
tionally, and buyers are more likely to give feedback unconditionally. Overall, this
is good news for eBay (and other trading systems that provide inter-partner perfor-
mance feedback). As traders participate more in the system, they are more likely
to be good citizens and hence provide feedback regardless of their trading partner’s
feedback giving actions.
Given our finding that new traders evolve into good citizens in terms of
feedback giving, we expected there to be some “indoctrination” going on among
eBay traders, but this does not appear to be true. Experienced sellers do not educate
new buyers by giving them more feedback; neither do experienced buyers attempt
to educate new sellers by giving them more feedback.
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We also found that with high valued items, buyers are more likely to give
feedback unconditionally but sellers are more likely to reciprocate. We speculate
that as buyers care about the quality of high valued items more, they are more likely
to pay attention and provide feedback. Experienced sellers would anticipate such
behavior and strategically choose to reciprocate.
We also make a methodological contribution by building an econometric
model to estimate feedback provision strategies in systems in which participants
engage in bilateral interactions. Such types of systems can be electronic market-
places, or systems that facilitate peer-to-peer sharing of services or resources. A
special feature of our model is that the two parties’ feedback provision strategies
can be contingent on each other’s actions, or not. Thus, either party can decide
whether to give feedback based on what the other party does. With multinomial re-
gressions, our model can be used to predict the participants’ strategy choices based
on their observable characteristics or the context of the interactions.
APPENDICES
A Robustness test of the timing distribution functional
form assumptions
In section 5 we reported our results estimated under the assumption that feedback
timing follows a lognormal distribution. To evaluate the robustness our results to
the assumed functional form of the distribution, we also estimated the model with
Weibull and Gamma distributions and report our results in Table 12.18 For the log-
normal function, we report the estimated coefficients of the independent variables
on the four dependent variables, By, Br, Sy, and Sr, and their associated p-values
for two-sided tests that they are not different from zero. To compare the results
estimated using Weibull and Gamma distributions to the lognormal distribution, we
report the percentage change (under the column “% ∆”) in each coefficient or pa-
rameter, that is, the percentage difference from the benchmark coefficient estimate
under the lognormal assumption.
From Table 12 we conclude that the specific functional form assumption
does not affect our results materially. Most percentage changes in the coefficients
are under 10%, except for three (highlighted in bold), all of which are below 25%.
18Based on our priors, we only considered distributions with non-negative support, and which can
be asymmetric with a long tail.
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Lognormal Gamma Weibull
Coef. P-Value % Err. % Err.
By newbuyer -0.11 -6.04 -0.48 -0.70
newseller -0.28 -11.78 -0.49 -0.20
newint -0.04 -1.5 0.43 2.32
lnfbbuyerr 0.19 37.54 -0.16 -0.02
lnfbsellerr -0.03 -8.38 0.44 0.50
lnprice 0.04 13.48 -1.56 -0.64
intercept -0.48 -19.2 0.94 0.31
Br newbuyer 0.18 4.91 2.75 0.41
newseller -0.29 -6.16 1.00 -1.14
newint 0.01 0.16 -20.25 -15.91
lnfbbuyerr 0.10 9.67 -0.66 -2.51
lnfbsellerr -0.07 -11.64 -0.85 -1.22
lnprice -0.05 -7.29 0.39 -0.44
intercept -0.31 -6.48 -4.69 0.46
Sy newbuyer -0.28 -7.89 0.32 1.15
newseller -0.09 -2.54 0.43 0.51
newint -0.12 -2.95 0.07 -0.68
lnfbbuyerr 0.08 10.45 0.47 1.40
lnfbsellerr 0.20 27.61 -0.04 -0.56
lnprice -0.04 -8.02 -0.03 2.24
intercept -0.27 -6.19 -0.52 -2.60
Sr newbuyer -0.31 -4 2.66 3.21
newseller 0.49 7.13 -0.48 3.48
newint 0.09 1.03 5.70 8.42
lnfbbuyerr 0.03 2.07 10.62 7.43
lnfbsellerr 0.20 13.87 0.25 0.85
lnprice 0.10 8.7 -1.58 3.46
intercept -1.60 -17.26 -0.88 -4.44
Table 12: Coefficient robustness under different timing distribution assumptions.
“% ∆” indicates the percentage difference from the benchmark coefficient estimate.
Changes of more than 20% highlighted in bold.
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B Robustness tests for the definition of “new trader”
We defined a “new” trader to be one with fewer than 5 feedbacks. In Table 13 we re-
port the estimates obtained using different cutoffs, i.e., 3, 7, and 10 feedbacks. Most
of the percentage errors are reasonably low, i.e., less than 50%. A few highlighted
percentage errors in these are more than 50%. Some of the estimated coefficients
that vary greatly across different cutoff values tend to have high p-values. For in-
stance, the coefficient on newint for the dependent variable Br has a percentage
error of 1026.02% when estimated with Cutoff = 3. But the benchmark estimate of
it with Cutoff = 5 has a p-value of 0.87. Thus this estimate was not statistically dif-
ferent from zero in the benchmark estimate. Examining other estimates with high
percentage errors reveals that they do not alter our results qualitatively, though the
size of the marginal effects might vary significantly depending on the cutoff values.
This result reinforces our conclusion: “newness” matters.
C Simulation results
To validate our maximum likelihood model, we conducted Monte Carlo simula-
tions. We report the simulation parameters and results in Table 14. Our simulated
sample has 959,657 data points, the same sample size as our actual dataset. First,
we arbitrarily picked a set of “true” parameter values, shown in the “True Coef.”
column, as the target true values to estimate. Next, we randomly generated the fol-
lowing independent variables each using a uniform distribution on [0,1]: newbuyer,
newseller, newint, ln f bbuyerr, ln f bsellerr, and lnprice. Using the true coefficient
values specified by us and the simulated independent variables, we generated the
probabilities of strategy choices for each trader, i.e., either By and Br or Sy and Sr
depending on the role of the trader. We then use these probabilities to randomly
select the “actual” strategy that the trader used. Last, using the selected strategies,
and the parameters we specified for the timing functions, we generated a time stamp
for each feedback given, if according to the trader’s strategy she would give a feed-
back. Taking this simulated dataset, we then estimated our model with lognormal
timing distributions, to obtain the coefficients shown in the “Coef.” column. For
each estimated coefficient, we also report its standard error (in the “SE” column),
and the p-value of a two-sided test that the coefficient is not different from zero (in
the “P-value” column). To analyze the simulation error, we compute the deviation
measured as the number of standard deviations, and report this in the final column.
Overall, our results indicate that our model is valid. With approximately one
million random draws, the distribution of simulation errors should converge close
to a normal distribution. In Figure 6, we plot the cumulative distribution of the
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Cutoff = 5 Cutoff = 3 Cutoff = 7 Cutoff = 10
Coef. P-Value % Err. % Err. % Err.
By newbuyer -0.11 0.00 -110.86 -19.35 -7.82
newseller -0.28 0.00 -7.54 24.36 13.77
newint -0.04 0.13 -34.93 -32.40 23.22
lnfbbuyerr 0.19 0.00 -9.55 -2.26 -13.82
lnfbsellerr -0.03 0.00 14.16 8.32 -18.15
lnprice 0.04 0.00 3.71 3.23 -1.21
intercept -0.48 0.00 8.23 2.40 28.01
Br newbuyer 0.18 0.00 -14.80 -77.24 52.70
newseller -0.29 0.00 9.38 19.16 -11.88
newint 0.01 0.87 1026.02 -258.55 392.86
lnfbbuyerr 0.10 0.00 -9.89 -37.60 23.65
lnfbsellerr -0.07 0.00 18.75 -5.65 -14.23
lnprice -0.05 0.00 -0.74 -0.35 18.68
intercept -0.31 0.00 -12.81 42.07 -18.19
Sy newbuyer -0.28 0.00 -10.18 27.41 11.87
newseller -0.09 0.01 -222.20 57.76 209.76
newint -0.12 0.00 -24.01 20.49 32.42
lnfbbuyerr 0.08 0.00 12.62 14.32 -21.85
lnfbsellerr 0.20 0.00 -12.09 3.88 4.12
lnprice -0.04 0.00 5.93 -0.43 -15.40
intercept -0.27 0.00 19.03 -26.86 23.56
Sr newbuyer -0.31 0.00 13.44 33.41 24.05
newseller 0.49 0.00 -31.34 -20.20 15.88
newint 0.09 0.30 5.40 -60.22 -79.11
lnfbbuyerr 0.03 0.04 62.42 47.21 -39.76
lnfbsellerr 0.20 0.00 -22.18 -5.95 9.00
lnprice 0.10 0.00 0.72 -0.19 -2.87
intercept -1.60 0.00 6.61 -0.51 -1.26
Table 13: Robustness test result on the number of feedbacks that defines new trader.
“% ∆” indicates the percentage difference from the benchmark coefficient estimate.
Changes of more than 50% highlighted in bold.
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Depd Var. Indepd Var. True Coef. Coef. SE P-value Err in SD
By newbuyer 0.000 0.042 0.015 0.004 2.842
newseller -0.250 -0.256 0.015 0.000 -0.422
newint 0.150 0.133 0.015 0.000 -1.140
lnfbbuyerr -0.300 -0.309 0.015 0.000 -0.589
lnfbsellerr 0.510 0.525 0.015 0.000 1.023
lnprice -0.100 -0.106 0.015 0.000 -0.400
intercept 0.300 0.288 0.018 0.000 -0.669
Br newbuyer 0.000 0.067 0.031 0.029 2.177
newseller -0.550 -0.548 0.031 0.000 0.057
newint 0.520 0.501 0.031 0.000 -0.608
lnfbbuyerr -0.200 -0.226 0.031 0.000 -0.842
lnfbsellerr 0.150 0.182 0.031 0.000 1.029
lnprice 0.300 0.279 0.031 0.000 -0.682
intercept -0.300 -0.323 0.038 0.000 -0.621
Sy newbuyer 0.000 0.024 0.014 0.079 1.756
newseller -0.300 -0.311 0.014 0.000 -0.822
newint -0.350 -0.345 0.014 0.000 0.330
lnfbbuyerr -0.500 -0.486 0.014 0.000 1.016
lnfbsellerr 0.350 0.353 0.014 0.000 0.232
lnprice -0.350 -0.324 0.014 0.000 1.867
intercept -0.400 -0.437 0.017 0.000 -2.202
Sr newbuyer 0.000 0.010 0.012 0.418 0.811
newseller -0.200 -0.198 0.012 0.000 0.149
newint 0.800 0.800 0.013 0.000 0.016
lnfbbuyerr -0.800 -0.763 0.012 0.000 2.973
lnfbsellerr 0.450 0.423 0.012 0.000 -2.149
lnprice 0.100 0.119 0.012 0.000 1.515
intercept 0.400 0.372 0.016 0.000 -1.797
Timing µsy 3.500 3.496 0.007 0.000 -0.542
Parameters σsy 2.000 1.997 0.005 0.000 -0.698
µby 4.000 4.000 0.003 0.000 0.033
σby 2.000 2.001 0.002 0.000 0.487
Table 14: Simulation Results with a sample of 959,657 data points.
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Figure 6: Comparing the cumulative distribution of the simulation errors with the
normal distribution.
normalized simulation errors against the predicted normal error distribution. The
tails are a bit heavier, but overall the fit is quite good and there are no outliers.
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